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Abstract 
Giving plays an important role in the contemporary economy, but this has been obscured by the 
perspectives of both mainstream economics and Marxist political economy. This paper draws on the 
work of J.K. Gibson-Graham to argue that this stunts our imagination about alternative futures, and 
on the work of Erik Olin Wright to suggest that gift-oriented economic practices could play a 
significant part in such futures. The most promising alternative economic futures involve not the 
replacement of a monolithic capitalism with some other monolithic alternative, but rather a 
changing mix of already-diverse economic practices. One part of the Marxist tradition that stands in 
the way of such thinking is its employment of the concept of modes of production, and the paper 
proposes complexes of appropriative practices as an alternative or supplementary concept. 
Keywords: appropriative practices, diverse economies, gift economy, mode of production, real 
utopias. 
 
Introduction 
How can we organise for a better future?1 Perhaps this question is best approached at a tangent, 
and this paper traces the beginnings of one such tangent. It is a tangent that starts from the notion 
of giving; giving both as a set of existing social practices, and giving as an element in a set of 
economic alternatives. Traditionally different sections of the left have advocated two routes to 
improving the organisation of our economy: reformist tinkering with capitalism on the one hand, or 
seizing the state to impose revolutionary change on the other. Neither of these, in my view, is a 
viable path to a radically better economy. Instead the tangent followed here passes through 
alternative ways of thinking about the economy that I have encountered in my work on the 
economic sociology of giving. The gift economy, in its various forms, does not offer an easy or a 
complete solution to the problem of finding better alternatives, but this paper will argue that giving 
                                                             
1 Previous versions of this paper were presented at the IACR annual conference in Nottingham in July 2013 and 
at Helsinki University in February 2014. I would like to thank the attendees for their stimulating comments and 
questions, this journal’s reviewers for their useful challenges, and indeed the many people with whom I have 
discussed giving for their helpful input. 
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does provide some important parts of the answer. Furthermore, recognising its potential helps to 
break down some important obstacles to thinking more openly about alternative futures in general.  
The paper begins by highlighting some of the ways in which the contemporary gift economy has 
been neglected by the social sciences. This links to an important argument from J.K. Gibson-Graham, 
who has/have suggested that both mainstream economics and the Marxist tradition have 
contributed to a highly distorted view of the economy – a view that ignores the major role that 
giving and other noncapitalist practices play in our economy already and as a result stunts our 
imagination about alternatives. I connect that in turn to the interesting and important work that Erik 
Olin Wright has been doing on envisioning real utopias. Wright’s work helps to open up that process 
of imagining alternatives, partly because it implies a movement away from the monolithic 
conception of modes of production that has dominated left thinking about the economy for far too 
long. But once we recognise both the diversity of our actual economy and the diversity that would 
still remain in more desirable alternatives, we need to go beyond Wright and think more flexibly 
about economic forms. To this end this paper introduces an alternative approach organised around 
the concept of appropriative practices. 
The neglected gift economy 
Let us begin with a definition of giving. I shall use this term in what I take to be its everyday sense, 
that is a voluntary transfer of goods or services from one party (the donor) to another (the recipient, 
or recipients) that is not accompanied by an immediate transfer in return.2 On this basis we can also 
define the gift economy: the gift economy consists of transfers of goods and services that take the 
form of giving and productive activity that is undertaken with the intention of giving the product.3  
The first part of my argument is that the contemporary gift economy is both extremely large and 
extremely significant socially, but that it has been badly neglected by the social sciences. Social 
scientists are often sceptical of claims that the gift economy is significant. But that scepticism, I 
suggest, derives from certain flawed assumptions about the nature of the economy made in both 
neoclassical economics and political economy. For these traditions, the economy is precisely 
coextensive with the commodity economy: it consists of transfers of goods and services that take the 
form of exchange and productive activity that is undertaken with the intention of exchanging the 
product. There may be grudging extensions for the state sector, which is brought back into the 
exchange economy by measuring it in terms of the purchase of inputs as commodities rather than in 
terms of the value of its outputs, but giving, and production for giving, is generally excluded without 
even an acknowledgement that the exclusion has taken place. The exceptions are gifts of money, 
and products which are produced and purchased as commodities in order to be given as gifts, which 
are generally of interest to economists only in their role as commodities, and cease to be of interest 
as soon as they have been purchased by the eventual giver of the gift.  
                                                             
2 Any definition raises further issues. Two seem unavoidable here. First: this definition does not entail that a 
sale on credit counts as a gift, since in such cases the purchaser makes an immediate transfer in return, in the 
form of a legally binding obligation to pay later: a debt to the seller. Second, this definition does entail that 
various forms of sharing count as giving, such as the sharing of resources by parents with their children. 
3 This intention need not be the only or primary motivation of the producer for such production to count as 
part of the gift economy. 
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More surprisingly, even sociologists have tended to be dismissive of the gift economy. Under the 
influence of the Maussian tradition of anthropology, sociologists have tended to treat giving as a 
marginal hangover from a pre-modern precursor to the market economy.4 As David Graeber has put 
it, referring to the free gift economy as communism, “The sociology of everyday communism is a 
potentially enormous field, but one which, owing to our peculiar ideological blinkers, we have been 
unable to write about because we have been largely unable to see it”.5 Ironically, this has often led 
sociologists to focus on much the same giving practices as those that marginally interest the 
economists, the giving of ritual gifts at birthdays, religious festivals and the like, and to ignore other 
important giving practices.6 
These are serious errors. We can never conceive of alternatives to the market economy if we fail to 
challenge the view that the economy is identical with the commodity economy. Economic 
alternatives are only thinkable if we take a view like that which has been developed, for example, in 
feminist economics and in Andrew Sayer’s work on the moral economy: that the economy should be 
defined not in terms of commodity exchange but in terms of the provisioning of goods and services.7 
When we do think of the economy in these terms, it becomes clear that giving is an economic 
activity in much the same sense that exchange is an economic activity, and producing to give is an 
economic activity in much the same sense as producing for sale. And when we look at the vast range 
of provisioning activity that occurs in contemporary society, we soon find that an enormous 
proportion of it occurs outside the commodity economy. 
That provisioning activity includes, for example, charitable giving, volunteering, blood and organ 
donation, ritual gifts on birthdays and other occasions, assistance to friends, neighbours, co-workers 
and indeed unknown passers-by, bequests, the creation of digital resources that are then freely 
shared with others on the Internet (including, for example, web pages, advice offered on Internet 
forums, Wikipedia pages, videos posted on YouTube, and open source software), and perhaps most 
substantially of all, sharing of resources and caring labour within the household.  
Measuring the scale of such activity is problematic, since by definition it is not traded and thus not 
valued in monetary terms. Nevertheless, some hints are available in the literature as to the scale of 
some of these activities. For a first example, consider charitable giving. This is a worldwide 
phenomenon. Based on global poll data, the Charities Aid Foundation has estimated that in 2011 
45% of the world population gave help to strangers, 28% gave money to charity, and 18% 
volunteered their time to an organisation.8 For a second, consider what we may call digital gifts. Just 
one element of this is the creation of free to view web pages. Chris Anderson’s “back-of-the-
envelope” calculation of the unpaid effort expended on building these suggests that if it was paid at 
a modest rate it might cost $260 billion a year.9 
These are just tasters, though, for the main course; the most significant set of neglected economic 
practices, in terms of scale, is caring work in the household. While it is sometimes forced, more 
                                                             
4 Godbout and Caillé 1998, vii. Also noted, for example, by Cheal 1988, 2;  Negru 2010, 198, 200. 
5 Graeber 2011, 100. 
6 For example Berking 1999;  Cheal 1988. 
7
 Nelson 1993;  Sayer 2004, 2. 
8 Charities Aid Foundation 2012, 6. 
9 Anderson 2009, 168. 
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typically such labour can reasonably be regarded as a form of giving to those who benefit from it.10 
To the extent that this is so, we may take estimates of the scale of household labour as indicators of 
the scale of this set of giving practices. Extensive statistical work has been done on this question, for 
example by Duncan Ironmonger, who concludes that in the case of Australia in 1992, and on 
reasonably conservative estimates of the value of household labour, “half of economic production 
comes from the household and half from the market” Ironmonger 1996, 53.11 If these figures are at 
all representative of the world economy as a whole, and if we add the many other forms of giving 
practices, it is reasonable to conclude that the gift economy as a whole, rather than being a marginal 
survival of premodern life, is at least similar in size to the market economy in contemporary society. 
A mixed economy 
One important implication of this argument is that the economy we live in today is far less capitalist 
than is usually assumed. Both neoclassical and Marxist thinkers routinely frame the contemporary 
economy as an essentially capitalist one (perhaps with a few minor non-capitalist survivals) 
swimming as it were in a non-economic sea of social practices that can largely be ignored in thinking 
about the economy itself.12 But if we define the economy in terms of provisioning, this is very far 
from being the case: giving and related practices make up perhaps half of the contemporary 
economy, and there are also other substantial portions of the economy that are by no means 
capitalist either, including the state sector but also subsistence agriculture, the self-employed and 
continuing pockets of slave labour.  
This argument has been developed persuasively by the feminist geographers writing as J.K. Gibson-
Graham.13 Gibson-Graham question “familiar understandings of capitalism as a naturally dominant 
form of economy, or as an entire system of economy, coextensive with the social space”.14 They 
argue that there is a dominant discourse of the economy, in which “capitalism is the hegemonic, or 
even the only, present form of economy”.15 Given their poststructuralist leanings, Gibson-Graham 
are somewhat reluctant to contrast this hegemonic discourse with actual economic diversity as a 
                                                             
10 In a context where women are expected to perform domestic labour and this expectation is 
backed by powerful gender norms, it may sometimes be problematic whether this is a voluntary act 
and thus a gift. Clearly some women enter such relationships voluntarily, and some are happy to 
perform this role, under the influence of these gender norms cf. Gibson-Graham 2006a, 224-5. 
Others may be under stronger compulsion, e.g. from domestic violence, and in such cases their work 
in the house must be regarded as forced labour rather than a gift. But much domestic labour is not 
done by women for the benefit of a dominant male partner anyway: much of it is expended on the 
care of children and the aged, or in single-sex relationships, or by men themselves, or in more 
egalitarian relationships Fraad, et al. 1994, 37-8;  Gimenez 1997;  Matthaei 1994, 48;  Molyneux 
1979. 
11 Williams comes to broadly similar conclusions about a range of twenty developed economies: between the 
1960s and the 1990s 44.7% of all working time in these economies was unpaid 2003. 
12 Although Marxists, unlike many mainstream economists, recognise the dependence of the economy on 
other ‘non-economic’ social practices. 
13
 Gibson-Graham 2006a and b. 
14 Gibson-Graham 2006a, ix. 
15 Gibson-Graham 2006a, 2. 
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reality that shows the discourse to be false,16 but their argument constantly tends in this direction. 
They describe a vast range of contemporary economic activity that does not fit the traditional model 
of the capitalist firm,17 arguing that “if we theorized [the economy] as fragmented… we could begin 
to see a huge state sector… a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most 
noncapitalist), [and] a huge household sector”.18 By no means all of these other economic practices 
fall within the gift economy as I have described it, and Gibson-Graham themselves see domestic 
labour as predominantly a feudal practice rather than as part of the gift economy.19 But they do 
include a broad range of giving practices within the diverse economy, and highlight a selection of 
these in reporting their empirical work in both the U.S. and the Philippines.20 
This diverse economy is concealed by the dominant capitalocentric discourse. Mainstream academic 
economics, with its orientation to commodity exchange, has made an important contribution to the 
construction of this discourse, but Gibson-Graham argue that the same effect is produced amongst 
more radical thinkers by the biases of Marxist political economy. Marxists are perhaps as likely as 
neoclassical economists to see the contemporary economy as one that is thoroughly saturated by 
capitalist commodity production, and to dismiss other forms of economy as survivals from a 
previous age, with no more than marginal continuing significance.21 While these understandings of 
capitalism were developed to stimulate political action, Gibson-Graham argue that they have now 
become an obstacle “contributing to a crisis in left politics”:22 
Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. 
When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the 
world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to 
define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a 
mass collective movement (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement 
might assist).23 
Given the absence of such movements and the utter implausibility of such systemic dissolutions in 
the current historical context, this perspective acts as “a brake upon the anticapitalist 
imagination”:24 it obscures the possibility, above all, that anticapitalist alternatives might be 
developed within the supposedly purely capitalist economy that we already have. Indeed it is not 
only a cognitive obstacle but also an emotional one: if to imagine incremental alternatives is 
necessarily fruitless, then there seems to be little point in hoping for anything better than social 
democratic tinkering in a thoroughly capitalist economy. 
Gibson-Graham themselves tend to see the alternative in linguistic terms: they seek to develop “a 
language of the diverse economy”25 in order to “disarm and dislocate the naturalized dominance of 
                                                             
16 See, for example, Gibson-Graham 2006a, xii. 
17 For example, Gibson-Graham 2006a, xii-xv. 
18 Gibson-Graham 2006a, 263. 
19 Fraad, et al. 1994;  Gibson-Graham 2006a, 61. 
20 Gibson-Graham 2006b, 150, 175-6. 
21 There are exceptions: Gibson-Graham are not the only thinkers to have challenged this aspect of Marxist 
thinking (see below). 
22 Gibson-Graham 2006a, 1. 
23
 Gibson-Graham 2006a, 263. 
24 Gibson-Graham 2006a, 3. 
25 Gibson-Graham 2006b, 60. 
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the capitalist economy and make a space for new economic becomings”.26 Most realists, I suspect, 
would feel that Gibson-Graham overstate the contribution that language can make, and understate 
the impact of the systemic forces of capitalism on our options, but the central thread of their 
argument is both sound and important. There is a powerful tendency on both left and right to think 
of the contemporary economy as thoroughly capitalist; this does obscure the existence of a vast 
range of noncapitalist economic practices in the contemporary economy; and that does discourage 
us from thinking of the development of such practices as a central plank of anticapitalist politics.  But 
if we reject that discourse we can begin to see the situation as less desperate: we are already 
surrounded by a range of viable and in some cases even thriving noncapitalist economic practices, 
and developing those alternatives is an important part of a viable anticapitalist strategy.  
This is not to deny the central role of capitalism in important sectors of the contemporary economy. 
Capitalism certainly dominates mechanised industrial production, for example, and has driven the 
development of much of the technology that has transformed human lives over the last two or three 
centuries. Nor is it to claim that there is some alternative comprehensive system standing ready to 
saturate economic space, as Marxists have often thought that socialism or communism might do. 
But capitalism itself is not a comprehensive system saturating economic space. Rather, it is a 
discursively and politically dominant element in what I’d like to call a mixed economy of practices: 
not, that is, a mixed economy of the state sector and the capitalist sector, but a far more diversely 
mixed economy. 
Envisioning alternative mixes 
Once we have recognised that our existing economy is already a diverse mixed economy of 
practices, it becomes easier to see the value of nurturing and supporting alternative economic 
practices that provide, not comprehensive alternatives to capitalism, but limited and partial 
elements in the changing mix of practices in the diverse economy. Again, important work has already 
been done in this area, notably under the banner of Erik Olin Wright’s Real Utopias project.  
A series of books by a variety of authors have appeared in the Real Utopias series, but Wright’s 
programme is outlined most comprehensively in his own book Envisioning Real Utopias.27 Wright 
abandons the traditional Marxist approach to alternatives to capitalism, which is largely to leave the 
future in the lap of the party and/or the anonymous forces of history.28 Instead, he argues, we need 
to think constructively about alternatives, and where possible start developing them now. These 
alternatives are his real utopias. They are utopian in the ethical sense that they are visions for “social 
institutions free of oppression”, visions that expand our imagination about what is possible.29 But 
they are also real in the sense that a proposal only qualifies as a real utopia if we can make a good 
case that it is viable and achievable. An alternative is viable if it would, when implemented, generate 
“the emancipatory consequences that motivated the proposal”,30 and it is achievable if there is a 
                                                             
26 Gibson-Graham 2006a, xii. 
27 Wright 2010. 
28
 An approach which has also been criticised, for example, by Andrew Sayer 1995, 14. 
29 Wright 2010, 6. 
30 Wright 2010, 21. 
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plausible path by which we could arrive at it: real utopias must be what Wright calls “destinations 
that have accessible waystations”.31 
There is a strong resemblance here to Roy Bhaskar’s concept of concrete utopianism, which he 
defines as “the exercise of constructing models of alternative ways of living on the basis of some 
assumed set of resources, counterbalancing actualism and informing hope”.32 Bhaskar’s introduction 
of sets of resources here implies that our utopian constructions should be feasible and viable in 
plausibly imaginable circumstances, while the reference to counterbalancing actualism suggests the 
need, as Wright suggests, to “expand our imagination” beyond what seems possible in the present 
circumstances. The purpose, Bhaskar writes, is “to pinpoint the real, but non-actualized, possibilities 
inherent in a situation, thus inspiring grounded hope”.33 Perhaps the most significant distinction 
between Wright’s discussion and Bhaskar’s is not so much the content of their concepts as the 
contexts in which they employ them. Bhaskar’s concrete utopias appear in a deeply philosophical 
account of the potential for social transformation, whereas Wright’s real utopias feature in an 
argument that is more directly related to the construction of practical political programmes. 
There are many attractive features of Wright’s project. One is that he thinks carefully through the 
issues involved in emancipatory social science. It involves, he argues, “three basic tasks: elaborating 
a systematic diagnosis and critique of the world as it exists; envisioning viable alternatives; and 
understanding the obstacles, possibilities, and dilemmas of transformation” and he stresses that “all 
are necessary for a comprehensive emancipatory theory”.34 Another is that he recognises the 
inherently ethical nature of both the task of critique and the development of alternatives, and 
explicitly outlines the ethical basis on which he builds: a “radical democratic egalitarian 
understanding of justice”.35 Third, and unlike Gibson-Graham, he recognises that capitalism has 
systemic tendencies to generate harms that are not purely dependent on the accompanying 
discursive regime and documents these thoroughly.36 Fourth, he recognises the resistance of the 
current system to change and examines strategies for addressing the obstacles this generates.37 
Fifth, he recognises that the future is open, rather than driven to some inevitable conclusion by the 
contradictions of capitalism, and thus that a successful emancipatory programme would not lead to 
a kind of perfect steady state society but rather to a continuing process of open contingent 
development.38  
What makes Wright’s project particularly compatible with the argument being developed here, 
however, is that many of his utopias are not totalising blueprints, not designs that purport to offer a 
new “unified system… crowding out all other economic forms”,39 but medium sized proposals for the 
                                                             
31 Wright 2010, 6. Both this attention to viability and achievability, and Wright’s explicit enunciation of the 
ethical agenda underlying his real utopias, develop arguments that have been offered by Andrew Sayer Sayer 
1997. 
32 Bhaskar 1993, 395;  Hartwig 2007, 74-5. 
33 Bhaskar 1994, 112 fn 1. 
34 Wright 2010, 10. 
35 Wright 2010, 12. 
36 Wright 2010, 37. 
37
 Wright 2010, 273. 
38 Wright 2010, 107-9, cf. Bhaskar 1993, 297. 
39 Gibson-Graham 2006a, 263. 
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redesign of social institutions that can be mixed diversely.40 Thus it is possible for many of these 
utopias to be developed as what he calls “interstitial processes”.41 As Wright points out, capitalism 
itself can be seen as “having developed in the interstices of feudal society”.42 Capitalism was only 
able to establish its discursive and political dominance, and only able to develop to the extent that 
makes possible its systemic consequences, as a result of the growth of capitalist practices within an 
earlier mixed economy of practices. New economic practices, beyond perhaps simple shifts in 
ownership, cannot be created on a large scale overnight and expected to run smoothly the next day; 
on the contrary, they need time to grow and mature. Hence any workable economic alternatives will 
almost certainly need to develop initially within the current context. There is therefore a strong 
parallel between Wright’s argument and the anarchist strategy of “forming the structure of the new 
society within the shell of the old”43 and a major focus of his project is identifying existing practices 
that can form the basis of real utopias.44 Indeed this vision also converges with more anarchist 
understandings of utopia in rejecting the idea of a single blueprint to be imposed universally.45 
Wright examines both political and economic innovations but it is the economic examples that are 
relevant to this paper. Some of his utopias would require large scale change driven by state power, 
such as an unconditional basic income,46 John Roemer’s proposals for market socialism,47 and 
Michael Albert’s “non-market participatory democratic economy”.48 Others, however, are based on 
actually existing economic practices, such as worker co-operatives, which he examines through the 
case of the Mondragón group in the Basque area of Spain,49 social enterprises, where he focuses on 
the organisation of child and elder care in Quebec,50 and Wikipedia.51 
The very idea that such practices can develop within the existing economy clearly depends on the 
assumption that the economy is in some sense a mixed economy, as Wright recognises. Although he 
describes capitalism as “a particular way of organizing the economic activities of a society”52 which 
seems to imply a view of capitalism as a totalising form, he nevertheless acknowledges that no 
society is ever purely capitalist, or indeed purely socialist.53 He recognises work like domestic labour 
and volunteering as economic,54 and thus as prompting a challenge to the view that we can 
characterise the economy as simply a capitalist economy. The presence of these other forms, and 
indeed of state enterprise, “can be understood as reducing the ‘capitalisticness’ of the economy”, 
and yet he continues: “to the extent that these variations all retain the core elements of the 
institution of private property in the means of production and markets as the central mechanism of 
                                                             
40 Wright 2010, x. 
41 Wright 2010, 323. 
42 Wright 2010, 323. 
43
 Constitution of the Industrial Workers of the World, cited in Wright 2010, 325. 
44 Wright does, however, distance himself from the anarchist view that emancipatory struggles can ignore the 
state: for Wright, the state too is “an arena of struggle” that cannot be neglected 2010, 335-6. 
45 Kinna 2014. 
46 Ackerman, et al. 2006;  Wright 2010, 217-222. 
47 Roemer 1994;  Wright 2010, 247-52. 
48 Albert 2003;  Wright 2010, 252-65. 
49 Wright 2010, 234-46. 
50 Wright 2010, 204-15. 
51 Wright 2010, 194-203. 
52
 Wright 2010, 34. 
53 Wright 2010, 124. 
54 Wright 2010, 36. 
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economic production, they remain varieties of capitalism”.55 Wright even recognises that this opens 
up what he calls “a knotty theoretical problem”: in these circumstances, “what justifies still calling 
the system as a whole ‘capitalism’? How much non-capitalism is needed before the resulting hybrid 
is something entirely new rather than a hybrid form of capitalism as such?”.56 He is unwilling to let 
go of the belief that our contemporary economy is a capitalist economy, but goes so far as to admit 
that “The use of the simple, unmodified expression ‘capitalism’ to describe an empirical case is thus 
shorthand for something like ‘a hybrid economic structure within which capitalism is the 
predominant way of organizing economic activity’”,57 and to recognise that there is no simple 
answer to “the question of what precisely is meant by the claim that capitalism is ‘dominant’ within 
a hybrid configuration”.58 
Wright, then, goes a long way towards recognising what I have called the mixed economy of 
practices, but there are still some crucial absences from his work. First, like most social scientists, he 
remains blinkered about the sheer extent of non-capitalist economic activity in the existing 
economy, which allows him to maintain the view that the contemporary economy is fundamentally a 
capitalist economy. Even the term “interstitial” that he uses to refer to alternative developments 
within the existing system reveals a sense that those alternatives occupy small gaps in a 
predominantly capitalist structure. Second, as a result, he fails to see the need to theorise all 
economic systems as hybrid. There is a clinging here to a certain version of the Marxist concept of 
modes of production as historical stages that will be questioned later in this paper. And third, his 
neglect of the gift economy is also linked to a neglect of the emancipatory possibilities offered by 
developments in the gift economy.  
The emancipatory potential of the gift economy 
Recently, Wright has taken a welcome step towards correcting this third neglect by including a piece 
by Yochai Benkler in a special issue of Politics and Society on the Real Utopias project.59 Benkler has 
written a series of important papers and books describing what he calls “commons-based peer 
production”60 or “sharing”,61 a form of production in which large numbers of individuals participate 
voluntarily in the production of benefits that are then made freely available – an element, in other 
words, of the contemporary gift economy. Benkler’s work is solidly supported with a wide range of 
actually functioning examples, many of them drawn from the digital information economy, and he 
has argued that “sharing is a pervasive modality of economic production”, if we define economic 
production as “the provisioning of goods and services that people value”.62 
Benkler argues that “Commons-based peer production has come to play a large role in the 
construction of the networked environment, networked culture, and the networked social order”.63 
It accounts for much of the standard-setting activity that has shaped the design of the Internet itself, 
                                                             
55 Wright 2010, 36. 
56 Wright 2010, 36. 
57 Wright 2010, 125. 
58 Wright 2010, 126. 
59 Benkler 2013. 
60 Benkler 2002, 375. 
61
 Benkler 2004, 275. 
62 Benkler 2004, 331. 
63 Benkler 2013, 214. 
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for the “development of some of the core software utilities that run the Web” and indeed for a great 
deal of other widely-used software, and for the free web encyclopaedia Wikipedia.64 
Wikipedia is a particularly pure case of the gift economy in action.65 It is created entirely by unpaid 
volunteers, and indeed anyone can edit (almost) any Wikipedia page. It is run with minimum levels 
of hierarchy, with disputes being resolved largely by the achievement of consensus under the 
guidance of a well-developed set of normative standards, and only rarely by the intervention of 
administrators, who are themselves volunteers selected on the basis of their previous contributions 
to the project.66 Its product is freely available to anyone who chooses to make use of it. Its running 
costs are low given the enormous levels of usage – at the time of writing it is the seventh most 
visited site on the Web67 – and are met entirely by soliciting voluntary donations from users; indeed 
the site does not even accept advertising.  
The phenomenon of open source software is a less pure case but an equally interesting one.68 This is 
software that is supplied (generally for free) along with its humanly-readable program code so that 
anyone with the appropriate skills can modify or extend it, and under license conditions that permit 
users to do exactly that.69 This provides the basis for cooperative development of the software, as 
any programmer can make improvements. Programmers who are interested in contributing to a 
product are free to choose what work to do on it, and then offer their improvements back to the 
open source community. An element of hierarchy does exist in these communities, as groups exist 
which consolidate the most successful modifications into new releases of the product, but despite 
this there is an unusually low level of hierarchy and centralised control given the complexity of the 
product. Nevertheless, open source communities have developed some of the most successful 
software in the world: an organisational feat that would previously have been considered 
impossible.70 Benkler reports, for example, that such software accounts for “roughly three-quarters 
of web servers” and “more than 70 percent of web browsers”.71 It also includes Linux, an operating 
system that is used by most of the major website providers, and Android, a variant of Linux that is 
now the most widely-used smartphone operating system in the world.72 
Open source software and Wikipedia’s web site are given freely to their users, and developed in a 
decentralised collaborative fashion using freely donated labour. Individuals contribute to it partly 
out of the sheer “pleasure of creation”,73 the pleasure of unalienated labour, in which the worker 
chooses her task, controls her own labour process and product, can interact with others involved in 
the process as a free and equal individual, and can exercise her creativity for the wider benefit of 
humanity.74 This is labour freed from the tyranny of the market, a kind of labour that is sometimes 
denigrated as a mere hobby, and yet a kind of labour that is intensely productive of the flourishing 
                                                             
64 Benkler 2013, 214. 
65 This paragraph is based largely on material from O’Sullivan 2009, and Reagle 2010. 
66 Forte, et al. 2009. 
67 Alexa.com 2013. 
68 For more on open source software as a form of gift economy, see Elder-Vass 2014.   
69 Stallman 2010, 3. 
70 Benkler 2013, 214. 
71 Benkler 2013, 220. 
72
 Linux Foundation 2012. 
73 Benkler 2002, 424. 
74 By contrast with alienated labour as described in Marx 1978 [1844], 74-6. 
2015-03 Giving &Soc Transfn PPV.docx  Page 11 
that our economies so often fail to generate. This is a model of economic production with overtones 
of Marx’s vision of communism and Kropotkin’s anarchistic view of societies based on mutual aid,75 
and it seems to fit very clearly with the agenda of developing noncapitalist economic practices. 
It is also a model of production that is enabled and encouraged by the particular socio-technical 
characteristics of the Internet. Where the product is information, the costs of duplicating and 
sharing that information are now trivial, and because information is a nonrival good, a good which 
can be used by multiple consumers without reducing its availability to others, its benefits are not 
reduced by widespread sharing. Benkler argues that in such contexts “the primary remaining scarce 
resource is human creativity. And it is under these conditions that the relative advantages of peer 
production emerge to much greater glory than possible before”.76 Indeed, in this context intellectual 
property rights that restrict such sharing are often an obstacle to the efficient social use of 
information.77 There are hints here of Marx’s argument that changes in the forces of production may 
lead to the existing social relations of production becoming fetters on the further development of 
production, but Benkler is less ambitious than this; his argument is that technological changes are 
simply making possible a shift in the balance of production towards commons-based peer 
production.78 
Indeed it seems unlikely that Benkler’s model could work for all kinds of production – most obviously 
large-scale mechanised industry, which depends on larger capital investments than most 
cooperating individuals are able to make. Commons-based peer production, then, is not being 
advanced as a universal replacement for capitalism, let alone a model for an entire economy.  
However, there are also other reasons to be cautious about overstating the potential of the digital 
gift economy. As was intimated above, not all digital gifts are entirely distinct from the capitalist 
commodity economy. Open source software, notably, is deeply intertwined or enmeshed with 
capitalist commodity relations.79 Many of the programmers who contribute to open source software 
are not independent individuals: in the case of the Linux kernel, for example (which may not be 
representative), only 17.9% of the changes made between 2005 and 2012 were made by unaffiliated 
individuals.80 The vast majority were made by programmers working for commercial software 
companies, notably Red Hat, Novell, Intel and IBM (these four contributed over 30% of the 
changes).81 While the data collection method means that some of these programmers may have 
been working on the project in their own time, it is clear that most of it is paid work, done for 
commercial companies, who are the real donors of this work to the project. 
This work is still a gift,82 and the open source software that results from it is still made freely 
available to its consumers, but the motives behind these contributions are primarily profit oriented. 
IT services companies, for example, who are actively involved in developing an open source product 
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develop deep expertise that enables them to provide support and integration services to companies 
that wish to use that product, and can offer, for example, to write fixes and new function for a 
customer which will then become part of the open source product.83 Red Hat, for example, market 
themselves as “The world’s leading provider of open source enterprise IT products and services”.84  
Many other digital gifts are also given for commercial motives. Google’s search results, YouTube’s 
videos, and Facebook’s status updates, for example, are given to us as gifts (and indeed by us in 
some cases) but also present Google, YouTube (owned by Google), and Facebook with prime 
advertising opportunities,85 and there are many free games available on a variety of digital platforms 
that create selling opportunities for the companies that build them.86 As Christian Fuchs has pointed 
out, on the Internet we constantly find “an entanglement of gifts within the commodity form”.87 
Such entanglements point us towards an important feature of the mixed economy of practices: our 
diversely mixed economy is not neatly divided into sites that fit unambiguously within one mode of 
production or another. On the contrary, the mixing of practices penetrates deep within the various 
sites of the economy. 
Problematising modes of production 
This paper has so far skirted around the question of the social ontology of economic forms, a 
question answered in the Marxist tradition using the concept of modes of production – a concept 
that has often seemed relatively uncontroversial. The argument that capitalism replaced feudalism 
as the dominant mode of production in Europe, for example, is a staple of sociological accounts of 
modernity, and the idea that social progress consists in replacing capitalism in its turn remains a 
central plank of radical politics. But the discussion above has repeatedly cast doubt on some of the 
senses in which the concept is routinely used. The remainder of this paper will examine those doubts 
more thoroughly and discuss what kind of response to them might be appropriate. In the process it 
will draw on and criticise some of the late twentieth century Marxist literature, although there is a 
vast range of Marxist writing it will leave untouched. 
The classic source of Marx’s concept is the 1859 Preface, which outlines in one long paragraph 
Marx’s theory of history. After introducing the “relations of production” and the “productive forces”, 
Marx tells us that “The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure 
of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which 
correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions 
the social, political, and intellectual life process in general”.88 And a little later: “In broad outlines 
Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as 
progressive epochs in the economic formation of society”.89 Even in these first two references to the 
concept a degree of ambiguity can be detected. In the first reference, mode seems to refer rather 
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loosely to the manner in which production occurs.90 By the second, it has become identified with 
some specific economic structures that define successive stages in the development of society.  
On the whole it is the latter usage that has prevailed in the Marxist tradition. Étienne Balibar, for 
example, despite his acknowledgement that mode has something of the sense of manner, identifies 
modes of production with states of the economic structure, and tells us that “the history of society 
can be reduced to a discontinuous succession of modes of production”.91 Similarly, in a formulation 
that makes sense only if modes of production dominate societies, Althusser proposes that different 
modes of production produce a different “society-effect”.92 
While there has often been some recognition that particular societies might include elements of 
multiple modes of production, Marxists have tended to marginalise this issue. As Hodgson puts it, 
“Although he acknowledged their real existence, when analysing the capitalist system in Capital, 
Marx ignored all the non-capitalist elements in that system. This was not merely an initial, 
simplifying assumption. They were assumed away at the outset, never to be reincorporated at a 
later stage of the analysis”.93 More recently, the work of Althusser and Balibar examines the relation 
between the economic contradictions of capitalism and contradictions in the superstructure, but 
largely ignores the problem of the relation between different economic forms, except as a feature of 
periods of transition between the epochs of one mode of production and another. Balibar does 
hypothesise “modes of production which have never existed in an independent form” such as 
commodity production by individuals, but without any consideration of how they might appear in 
combination with other modes of production in practice.94  
Thinkers in the Althusserian Marxist tradition have sometimes argued that there may be multiple 
modes of production within what they refer to as a social formation,95 but they see tend to see these 
as standing in a relation of dominance and subordination. John Harrison, for example, in postulating 
a “housework mode of production”, “argues that within a determinate social formation there may 
be subordinate modes distinct from the dominant, constitutive modes” – subordinate modes that 
may be vestiges of past modes, initial traces of future modes, or client modes “created or co-opted 
by the dominant mode to fulfil certain functions”.96 Molyneux criticises Harrison for offering an 
argument that is inconsistent with both Balibar’s and more traditional conceptions of the mode of 
production because this household mode “could never become generalised” to the whole 
economy.97 There is a strong sense here that for Marxists the mode of production is to be seen as a 
single dominant form of social relations that either constitutes or dominates all economic practice 
within the social formation concerned.  
G.A. Cohen, while using the term mode of production rather differently, substitutes the concept of 
social forms and uses it in much the same way as these other thinkers use mode of production. For 
Cohen capitalism, feudalism, and the like are successive social forms of economic structure, and 
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although he acknowledges the theoretical possibility of diverse social relations coexisting within an 
economic structure, he sees Marx as assuming that “the production relation binding immediate 
producers will be broadly invariant across a single social formation”.98 Cohen does recognise that 
there is always likely to be some mix of production relations in any given social formation, but 
immediately trivialises this possibility by arguing that “In real and stable economic structures, one 
kind of production relation binding immediate producers is dominant”.99 
Within the critical realist tradition, Andrew Sayer has argued somewhat more openly for the idea 
that “actual economies combine several different forms of organization”.100 Bob Jessop, drawing on 
the regulation approach, has stressed the dependence of capital on “other systems and the 
lifeworld”,101 though he tends to present that which lies outside capitalism as the “extra-
economic”,102 thus reinforcing the dominant Marxist tendency to identify the economy itself purely 
with capitalism in contemporary social formations. 
This treatment of modes of production as economic forms that dominate a society, while other 
forms are essentially marginal, is clearly problematic in the light of the earlier sections of this paper. 
The coexistence of economic forms is not a purely transitional phenomenon but a permanent 
feature of all complex economies, and even our contemporary society is one where capitalist 
economic activity is in the minority. Hence we need to retheorise this space that is currently 
occupied by an essentially monolithic concept of the mode of production – not only because this 
concept fails to accommodate contemporary social reality, but also because that failure is politically 
consequential. In obscuring the diversity of noncapitalist practice in existing society it directs the 
attention of those seeking economic alternatives away from the possibility of developing alternative 
forms within a diverse economy. This monolithic conception of the economy leads directly to a 
monolithic conception of political action, in which control of the state becomes the only route and 
the wholesale replacement of one economic monolith with another becomes the only destination. 
Retheorising modes of production? 
How might we go about retheorising economic forms? One way forward might be to build on 
Cohen’s suggestion that we use mode of production in something close to the first of the two senses 
employed in the Preface: “A mode of production is a way of producing”.103 While this moves us in 
the right direction, I think, I doubt whether we can successfully detach such a widely used concept 
from the ways in which it is customarily employed, and this paper will therefore suggest new terms. 
The concept of a “way of producing”, of course, is spectacularly vague, and Cohen himself goes on 
immediately to point out that “there are many ways of differentiating ways”.104 We must ask, for 
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example, what aspect of producing differentiates economic forms105, but we must also ask what the 
units are that we are seeking to characterise when we identify these different ways of producing.  
Let me begin with the units. The traditional identification of modes of production with historical 
epochs implies that a mode of production is a feature of a whole social formation, that is a whole 
society. Both terms are problematic in the sense that they tend to assume what Daniel Chernilo calls 
methodological nationalism, that is, that societies are bounded by state borders.106 But whether the 
term is used in that sense, or to refer to a more global concept of society (and Marxists 
overwhelmingly do recognise that national formations are deeply embedded in a more global 
network of relations), it is clear from the arguments made earlier in this paper that in both cases 
economic processes are far too diverse for the social formation to be a viable unit to which to apply 
the concept. If it can be stripped of its methodologically nationalist connotations, the concept of a 
social formation is a useful one: it highlights the existence of a broader set of social relations within 
which capitalism, for example, may coexist with other economic forms. But because there may be 
multiple modes of production or economic forms within a social formation, the unit that can be 
identified unambiguously with a given economic form must be a smaller unit than the whole social 
formation. 
Those thinkers who have sought to develop the argument that there might be multiple modes of 
production within a given social formation have tended to think of the unit of economic form as 
what we may call a site, or perhaps more accurately, a social entity. Thus, for example, the domestic 
labour debate often seems to have been conducted on the assumption that capitalism operated 
within commercial businesses, whereas some other economic form, if there was one, operated 
within the household. Although the concept of the household is typically identified with the space of 
the home, and that of the commercial business may be identified with the space of the factory, 
shop, or office, these identifications with geographical sites are somewhat crude. Thus, for example, 
when an office worker works from home she is engaged in activity on behalf of the business that 
employs her rather than household activity, and when a housewife shops in a supermarket she is 
engaged in activity on behalf of the household rather than work for the business that operates the 
shop. A more plausible version of the argument, therefore, identifies the social entity as the unit: in 
these cases the geographically spread business or household. Gibson-Graham, for example, 
generally argue in this way: they identify privately owned firms as capitalist, and a whole range of 
other social entities such as family businesses, households, and co-operatives as noncapitalist.107 
Yet even this is unsatisfactory. Not all activities within the household can plausibly be seen as cases 
of the same economic form, and not all activities within commercial businesses can be seen as 
capitalistic. One way of making this argument would be to suggest that different economic forms 
operate in different households, as is implicit in Fraad, Resnick and Wolff, (note that they avoid the 
term mode of production).108 There is some value in this argument, but I suggest that it still 
misidentifies the unit of analysis. Even within one and the same household multiple economic forms 
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may be at work. Thus, for example, some households mix work done without direct renumeration by 
family members with work done as wage labour by outsiders working, for example, as nannies, 
housekeepers, cleaners or gardeners. Miriam Glucksmann, for example, documents some fascinating 
mixes of paid and unpaid domestic labour in her study of women workers in 1930s Lancashire.109 
There is considerable scope for debate about what mode of production or economic form each of 
these forms of labour represents, but it seems clear that they are two different modes with different 
sets of social relations of production. Similarly, within commercial businesses wage labour is 
accompanied by activities that can more plausibly be regarded as parts of a gift economy: most 
notably the work that workers do to assist each other.110 Some of the cases of entanglement of the 
commodity and gift economies in the digital environment discussed above also illustrate the point: 
when a salaried programmer in a profit-oriented commercial software company spends time writing 
open source code that is freely given to users of the software concerned it is not clear that this can 
be neatly filed under “capitalist mode of production”. 
I propose, therefore, that the unit that we can characterise as belonging clearly to a specific 
economic form is neither the social formation nor the social entity, but rather specific acts or 
practices, where a practice is a tendency to act in a certain way. Thus, for example, in the case of 
workers helping each other out while they work as wage labourers for a commercial business, the 
practice of wage labour and the practice of appropriating surplus as profit are surely capitalist 
practices, while the practice of assisting one’s fellow workers is not. Similarly, in the case of salaried 
programmers writing open source code, the practice of wage labour may be capitalist, as is the 
practice of selling support services at a profit, but the practice of writing open source code is a gift 
economy practice. 
If we may take practices as the unit of economic form, we can move on to consider what aspect of 
producing is at issue when we seek to differentiate economic forms, and even whether it is really 
producing at all that is the focus of the concept. For Marx the definitional difference between 
different modes of production is the difference in the set of social relations in which production is 
embedded.111 Thus, under capitalism the decisive relation is that between wage labourers and the 
capitalists who employ them and sell their product, whereas under feudalism the decisive relation is 
between serfs and the landlords who have the right to a share of their produce or of their labour 
power. What differs between these is the social basis upon which the occupants of different class 
positions are able to claim a portion of the product of labour. While there may also be differing 
allocations of control over the labour process, these do not seem to be definitional of either the 
class roles or the mode of production. Thus, despite the apparent focus of the term on production, it 
is the acts of appropriation of the product that are definitional of the different modes of production. 
A mode of production, we may say, is defined by the social relations that determine the 
appropriation of its products.  
This appropriation, under capitalism, is the product of a series of different processes, spread over 
time. The practice of wage labour involves at least three logical stages: the contract, the labour, and 
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the payment of the wage. As a result of undergoing the first two processes, the worker is entitled to 
receive, and generally does receive, the wage, and in this form appropriates her share of the 
product. Similarly, for the capitalist, appropriation depends on a practice with multiple stages: a 
contract that grants them ownership of the product of labour, the production process itself, and 
selling the product for more than its cost of production. The capitalist mode thus depends, not on 
one single practice, but on a combination of at least two practices: the practice of wage labour, and 
the practice of capitalists taking possession of the product and selling it as a commodity. 
At least two consequences follow. First, appropriation and thus the character of the economic form 
(and even the character of Marx’s modes of production) depends not only on acts of production but 
also on acts of transfer: transfers of products and sometimes of money. 112 In the capitalist case 
these transfers take the form of exchange but there is no necessity for this to be the case. The serf’s 
transfer of a share of their product to the landlord, for example, is not an exchange; nor is the 
transfer of a parent’s caring services to their child. Second, modes of production depend on 
complexes of multiple practices, and it is only when the full complex is present that forms like 
capitalism may be said to exist. Wage labour alone, for example, is not enough to give us capitalism, 
since people may work for wages in a variety of non-capitalist enterprises.113 Nor is commodity 
production enough to give us capitalism, since individuals working alone, or family businesses that 
do not pay wages may produce and sell commodities.114  
Complexes of appropriative practices 
There is more to be said about these complexes, but we have reached a point where we can reflect 
again on terminology. If the term mode of production is indeed too wedded to the monolithic 
conception of a form that dominates particular epochs to be repositioned without dispute and 
confusion, how can we improve on it? Given that the distinction between practices discussed above 
depends on their different implications for the appropriation of products of labour, and given that 
Marx’s different modes depend not just on single practices but on complexes of separable practices, 
I propose to use the term complex of appropriative practices or CAP for short.  
Appropriative is perhaps not an ideal term, as it sometimes has the connotation that the person who 
receives the benefit actively takes it, and it is not my intention to suggest this. Unfortunately 
alternative terms tend to have directly opposite and equally unsatisfactory connotations – allocative 
and distributive can both seem to imply that the person who provides the benefit actively 
determines who receives it. Transfer is perhaps more suitable in this respect, as it is more neutral 
about who is in control of the process, but there isn’t a cognate adjective. The best I can do here is 
point out that my use of the term appropriative carries no implication as to who is in charge of the 
process of transfer. Similarly, I should make clear that my use of the term does not imply any ethical 
judgement about the practices concerned, unlike the occasional use of the term appropriative 
practices in cultural and religious studies, where it generally seems to indicate disapproval of the 
practice concerned.115 Indeed, one virtue of the term is that in using it I seek to distance myself from 
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the connotation that appropriations by anyone other than the producer of the product concerned 
are necessarily exploitative.116 I also depart from Marx in that, according to Balibar, he uses the term 
appropriation to include the process of production itself, which he regards as an appropriation of 
nature by the producer,117 whereas my usage is confined to the division of the spoils of the act of 
production. 
This concept of a complex of appropriative practices, I argue, has several advantages over the 
monolithic conception of a mode of production (though I leave open the possibility that the two 
concepts may complement each other in some way, rather than being entirely mutually exclusive). 
Generalising, we may say with Hindess and Hirst that the monolithic conception of a mode of 
production leads to “the restriction of analysis to an extremely limited range of economic class 
relations and the consequent neglect of the problems of conceptualising more complex forms of 
class relations”.118 Hindess and Hirst take the argument in other directions, but here I want to 
examine some of the ways in which CAPs allow us to theorise social relations more flexibly. 
The first and most obvious of these, which follows from the argument of the earlier parts of this 
paper, is that there is no difficulty in theorising the coexistence of multiple CAPs. There is no longer a 
conflict, for example, between the belief that capitalism is an important element of the 
contemporary economy and the recognition that it governs only a minority of productive processes, 
and thus there is no longer a need to obscure the significance of the gift economy or indeed of other 
noncapitalist CAPs that coexist relatively stably alongside capitalism. Given this, we can abandon the 
attempt to reduce all contemporary class relations to capitalist appropriation of the product of wage 
labour that is characteristic of the most vulgar Marxism, and start to theorise the social relations and 
practices of appropriation that characterise these other CAPs. We need no longer, for example, 
ignore the appropriation of caring services by children in households because Marxism implies that 
this would make children exploiters of their parents, but rather examine the complex of processes in 
which this occurs as a CAP in its own right. We can escape from the hidebound pigeonholing of all 
social relations into what Folbre and Hartmann have called “a formulaic set of class processes”,119 no 
longer constrained by the requirement that only processes that dominate an epoch can count as 
class processes.  
As well as examining the coexistence of multiple complexes of appropriative practices within the 
economy, however, we now have the tools to examine such coexistence within specific sites or 
social entities. The fact that commercial firms are the site of capitalist CAPs is no longer a theoretical 
obstacle to the recognition that they may also be the site of other forms of appropriative practice. 
Nor is the argument that households are the site of gift-forms of appropriative practice 
compromised by recognising that they may also be the site of wage labour, whether it is capitalist 
(e.g. when an agency supplies cleaning staff) or not (e.g. when a self-employed cleaner contracts to 
provide a service). The household, in this perspective, becomes the site of moments of appropriation 
that operate within the frames of a variety of different complexes of appropriative practices. It is, we 
may say, a mixed economy of practices in its own right. Struggles within the household over the 
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division and control of domestic labour may then also be theorised as struggles over the mix, 
struggles over which complex of appropriative practices is to prevail in which circumstances.  
Relaxing the requirement that an economic form must correspond to the dominant form of an 
epoch also makes it easier to theorise varieties of a form. If, for example, the general form of the 
capitalist CAP can be characterised as suggested above by the combination of wage labour and 
commodity production, we can postulate varieties of capitalism in which this general form is 
combined in a larger complex with further appropriative practices. Thus, for example, we might 
distinguish between private capitalism in which the capitalist is an individual, and joint-stock 
capitalism in which ultimate rights to control capital and share in its appropriation of profit are 
distributed across a larger group through the practices of shareholder voting in general meetings 
and dividend distribution. Marxist thinkers have certainly made such distinctions already; as Jessop 
argues, for example, “there is no logic of capital but a series of logics with a family resemblance, 
corresponding to different modes of regulation and accumulation strategies”.120 The concept of 
appropriative practices may be compatible with readings of the concept of mode of production that 
allow such diversity, if they can also be reinterpreted to address the other concerns raised here. 
One of the most valuable features of Marx’s work on modes of production is his examination of the 
mechanisms through which capitalism produces systemic effects such as the drive to growth, a 
tendency to cycles of boom and slump, and a tendency to extend capitalist commodity production 
progressively into wider territories and more products. To put the argument in terms borrowed from 
contemporary realist theory, these are emergent effects that result from those interactions of 
individuals and firms that are produced by the appropriative practices that are characteristic of 
capitalism. I would argue that when individuals and agents interact in these ways they form larger 
collectives – though not necessarily collectives that we should identify with the concepts of society 
or social formation – with the causal power to produce these tendencies.  
If this is the case, then we must ask what the mechanisms are that generate these causal powers 
and tendencies, and precisely what relations do they depend upon? It is not at all clear, for example, 
that the combination of wage labour and commodity production, even when aggregated up to a 
macro scale, is enough to produce all of these tendencies. Do we need to identify further practices 
that interact with these to offer a full account of these systemic tendencies of capitalism? Might it 
be, for example, that we need to add certain capital market practices to the postulated complex 
before we can explain the orientation of capitalists to the accumulation of capital that generates the 
tendency to progressively extend commodity production? Different varieties of capitalism, 
characterised by the addition of further practices to the basic set that defines capitalism in general, 
may have different systemic consequences, and tracing the development of those practices may 
allow us to explain developments in the systemic effects of capitalism.  
The CAP approach, however, also enables us to go further than this. Now that we have recognised 
the coexistence of multiple CAPs, we can consider what systemic effects might arise from the 
interaction of different CAPS. In practice, radical thinkers have been doing this for a long time, but 
they have always faced objections to any treatment that gives equal status to CAPs other than the 
mode of production considered dominant in the epoch concerned. Marx himself theorised the 
reproduction of labour power in the household, but only as a kind of auxiliary function of capitalist 
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exploitation, yet the thrust of his argument is that the capitalist form is utterly dependent upon 
these other forms of production and appropriation.121  
More recently than Marx, the French Regulation School theorists have argued that the capitalist 
economy has gone through a series of regimes of accumulation marked, among other things, by 
changing relations “between capitalism and non-capitalist modes of production”.122 Thus, for 
example, Aglietta argues that in the United States in the nineteenth century capitalism benefitted 
from an environment in which its workers depended on non-commodity relations in the realm of 
domestic production to supply much of their consumption needs, as a result of remaining embedded 
in “the extended family and neighbourhood community”.123 This allowed wages to be low; but later 
the development of heavy industry “enforces the total uprooting that is characteristic of the wage 
relation: the separation of labour power from all its conditions of existence” with the result that 
wages had to rise to cover the cost of reproducing labour power once this could no longer be 
subsidised by non-commodity relations of production.124 In the terms I have developed here, this is a 
different conjunction of complexes of appropriative practices that produces quite different systemic 
effects.125   
Where do we go from here? 
This paper has traced a thought process that is still in motion – beginning from the unrecognised 
importance of the contemporary gift economy and progressing to a re-evaluation of one of the 
central terms in the social ontology of political economy. It remains unclear how closely this tangent 
might approach to the centre of the problem of alternative futures; this will clearly depend on 
further development of the argument. Let me close this paper by suggesting three sets of issues that 
arise from the argument so far.  
First, there are certain tasks that would seem to be required to develop the argument. If, in 
particular, the connection to the gift economy is to be completed, then we will need to identify the 
various complexes of appropriative practices at work in the gift economy. We should also consider 
what systemic effects these practices have already, and might have in the future, and how they 
interact with capitalist CAPs to produce hybrid emergent properties. What are the consequences of 
the gift economy, for example, for the mechanisms of capitalism postulated by Marx, and indeed 
Keynesian and neoclassical economists? And how are the emergent properties of gift economies 
impacted by various forms of entanglement with capitalist production? These are largely new tasks 
for political economy since both the neoclassical and Marxist approaches simplify the scientific task 
by ignoring the non-commodity economy. And yet they are tasks that could make important 
contributions to discussions on the viability and achievability of real utopias based on these 
practices. 
                                                             
121 Marx 1954 [1867], chapter 6. 
122 Brenner and Glick 1991, 47. 
123 Aglietta 2000 [1976], 80. 
124 Aglietta 2000 [1976], 81. 
125 This is not to say that the Regulation School would accept other parts of my argument here. Only a few lines 
later, for example, Aglietta argues that “there certainly is a universal extension of the capitalist mode of 
production in the social formations in which it is implanted” Aglietta 2000 [1976], 81. For him, it seems, 
dependence on other modes of production is no more than a transitional phenomenon. 
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Secondly, I have said very little about the relation of this argument to critical realism, though I hope 
it is clear that it is built on realist foundations. Although I have not mentioned them, this approach to 
practices rests firmly on realist concepts such as the TMSA, morphogenetic cycles, and norm 
circles.126 Perhaps the most striking implication is that this is the beginnings of an argument in the 
field of critical realist political economy. Relatively little substantive critical realist work has been 
done in political economy, but a number of scholars have discussed the relation between critical 
realism and Marxism and further work on this tangent should engage with their contributions.127  
Finally, what is the political significance of the argument, and in particular its significance for 
organising alternative futures? On the one hand, it provides grounds for some limited optimism: the 
domination of our economies by capitalism is less than it might seem in the light of the prevailing 
discourses of the economy, and it must be possible to build alternatives alongside capitalist 
economic practices since this is already occurring. Indeed, it is only if we do build alternatives 
alongside capitalism that viable alternative economic futures can be developed, and we should 
welcome the work of thinkers like Wright and Benkler who are examining some of the ways in which 
this could occur. On the other hand, however, this optimism must be qualified. Alternative 
appropriative practices can themselves be entangled in capitalist forms, and ultimately the viability 
of alternative futures will depend not only on growing them within our existing economy but also on 
finding ways to criticise and curtail the role of capitalist appropriative practices. Capitalism, despite 
being only part of our contemporary economy, is still capable of generating massive harms – notably 
extreme exploitation, alienation, inequality, massive distortions in the use of resources, 
environmental damage, and support for oppressive political regimes. It is still backed by enormous 
political and discursive power, and it constantly tends to subvert alternatives to its thirst for profit. 
Political work to overcome these harms and counter this power will never become redundant; but 
we will never be able to overcome them without viable economic alternatives to put in the place of 
capitalist appropriative practices. Attending to the place of giving in our existing economies helps to 
open our eyes to the opportunities for such alternatives. 
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